Five main trends in post-invasion Russian journalism

Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine and the following draconian military censorship has drastically changed Russia’s media landscape. It has unleashed pro-invasion propaganda, which has permeated most of the media outlets that remain in Russia. Many outlets eager to report about the war independently were forced to shut their doors, others decided to take the unpredictable middle ground and apply self-censorship to keep highlighting stories they could only cover adequately when based in Russia. Some relocated abroad and registered as media companies or non-profits in countries like Latvia, Georgia, or the Netherlands. 

The Fix Media has been closely monitoring these changes and one year and a half into the invasion, we can pinpoint five major trends visible in Russian media, both in the country and abroad: 

Telegram is one of the rare messaging and social media platforms to remain unblocked both in Russia and abroad and to abstain from censoring any opinions or revealing data of its users to the Russian authorities. 

The truth is, however, that even though it has become outlet number 1 for many anti-war media projects, it is the Russian propagandists (that already dominate Russian broadcasting) that take the primary cut of followers on the platform. Telegram channels of state news agencies such as RIA Novosti, politicians like the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, TV personalities such as Vladimir Solovyov, and the “voenkory”, pro-Kremlin correspondents like Semyon Pegov, reach millions of subscribers – significantly more than the four-to-five-figure followers average among anti-war accounts, which often draw their largest audiences from Telegram only.

Furthermore, the recent brainchild of the Russian authorities, the hijacking of the fact-checking news format, has also enjoyed popularity in the last months which in numbers beat several prominent opposition channels.

Often labelled as “hostile” organisations towards Russia and blocked in the country, many media outlets that left the country had to reassess their business models in order to survive. 

Some opted for membership subscriptions, while others started to develop their own, non-journalistic products, such as merchandise and VPNs (virtual private networks), with the latter targeted either at Russians who stayed in Russia or those who are now abroad and have difficulties accessing Russian governmental websites. 

Moreover, it has become popular among these media outlets to launch English editions in order to boost visibility among potential Western donors and advertisers.

It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of Russians have fled Russia since the all-out invasion in February 2022, either as a statement against the regime, as job-seekers or in fear of getting drafted into the army. Moving into and settling down in a new country requires information relevant to your new surroundings, and several, often brand-new media initiatives have jumped in to fill out that niche for the new diaspora. 

Among those who left were also “old” media outlets, some left Russia ultimately, and others opted to relocate editors only (and male coworkers after the mobilisation). Being based abroad as a media company raises the question: Is it possible to remain in touch with the audiences you have left behind, and how? 

While they try to answer that question, it seems that the best job at serving local audiences are those media outlets that still have most of their staff on the ground, especially when it comes to regional media outlets. Yes, they have to apply strict self-censorship and sometimes even operate anonymously. Still, it seems that such an approach brings more trust than independent reports from someone based abroad and not in touch with the local risks and realities.

Nowadays, criticism in Russia comes with harsh consequences and therefore anti-war media outlets have resorted to anonymity in their reporting by protecting the names of their journalists and sources to levels not seen before in Russian media. 

Nevertheless, many media outlets have succeeded in retaining their audiences’ trust, especially those that focus on the brand over individual media personalities, meticulous fact-checking and quality interaction with sources.

Exiled media outlets, forced to reinvent their operating models, tend to establish themselves not as businesses but rather as non-profit organisations or activism projects, especially when it comes to projects that focus on human rights, youth media, or investigating corruption. 

This is partially due to the realisation that working for profit has ceased to be a realistic business option, as well as the fact that most of these media outlets position themselves very strongly against the war and the regime and increasingly lean towards civic engagement activism.

Russian media manager Ilya Krasilshchik, founder and CEO of HelpDesk Media, a Russian-language media outlet and support service launched after the start of the 2022 invasion, has recently come to the conclusion that the war has  “broken” everything, including Russian journalism. 

What does that mean for the Russian media landscape?

When asked by The Fix, Krasilshchik noted that people right now need media outlets that guide them on how they can act in times of war.

“[It is to] notice the request and turn it into actions that will be useful,” Krasilshchik elaborated on his post, talking about the Russian media sector. 

Acting also means raising money for those affected by the war. “It now seems like a necessary thing for media outlets. This is a completely new approach, for Russian media at least, and it is becoming a system,” Krasilshchik notes. As long as people are willing to donate money, he expects media-led charity fundraising campaigns to expand in the following year. 

That said, it is difficult to talk about one solution or perspective for the Russian media landscape. “We should be as flexible as possible,” Krasilshchik says. “We see that different things are needed at different times.”

When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced military mobilisation in September 2022, many media initiatives turned overnight into a support service for anyone who didn’t want to get drafted into the army. When that front calmed down, new necessities showed up, such as the need to help purchase generators for Ukraine in winter or raise monetary support for those affected by the destruction of the Kakhovka dam. 

In any case, it is very difficult to talk about any kind of development right now or what will happen next. “There is no development right now, only outbreaks [of needs],” Krasilshchik comments on the situation in the Russian media landscape.

Source of the cover photo: Dolche far niente, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons